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“The Euro, probably more than any other currency, represents the mutual confidence 
at the heart of our community. It is the first currency that has not only severed its link 
to gold, but also its link to the nation state.”  
(Wim Duisenberg, then President of the ECB in 2001, quoted in: Marsh 2009:1). 
 
“Europe’s integration could not succeed if it promised to make the strong regions 
stronger and the weak ones weaker.” 
(Magnifico 1973: 8) 
 
 
For Wim Duisenberg, the Euro’s perceived independence from the nation-state was a path-
breaking achievement, to be proud of and to cherish. Little more than a decade later – and 
three years into the deepest economic crisis Europe has known since the Great Depression – 
Duisenberg’s elation rings strangely anachronistic, since what the ‘nation-less’ Euro seems 
to have achieved, above all, is to undermine whatever ‘mutual confidence at the heart of 
our community’ there may have been at the start.  
 
This Special Issue takes stock of the Eurocrisis so far. It is concerned with the in-depth 
analysis of its main causes, policy proposals for a recovery from the crisis and reform 
strategies for the reconstruction of a more viable and egalitarian Eurozone in the future. 
This introduction provides an overview of both core features of the Eurocrisis and related 
debates, as well as individual contributions to this Special Issue. Section 1 examines the 
origins of the Eurocrisis; Section 2 reviews key policy developments in the evolution of the 
crisis, from its onset in May 2010 to the adoption of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) in September 2012; and Section 3 provides an overview 
of the contributions to the Special Issue. 
 
1.  Origins of the Crisis 
 
The construction of the European Union (EU)– and its development since the introduction of 
a common currency in 2001 – had both political and economic objectives. This section 
focuses on the latter, but necessarily takes into account the former.  
 
From the point of view of mainstream economic theory, there is little doubt that European 
economic integration should benefit member states. Joining a customs union – and, 
subsequently also a currency and monetary union in the case of some member states –  
restricts national policy autonomy and the ability to correct macroeconomic imbalances vis-
à-vis other member states and the rest of the world: Without substantial policy control over 
trade, exchange rate or monetary policies, such imbalances can be managed only through 
real wage and price adjustments. However, from the point of view of mainstream economic 
theory, this is of minor concern, so long as it can be presumed that markets for core 
production factors are flexible across nations within the customs (and monetary) union, and 
that adjustment costs in the process of specialization and integration are minor. The 
distribution of overall gains from trade and monetary integration may be unequal, but 
overall gains there would be.  
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This vision, based on a politically and ideologically motivated belief in the superiority of 
“free markets” has not stood the test of time in the case of European economic and 
monetary integration. 
 
The prevailing view in the core1 – which dominates economic policy-making – is that the 
crisis is fiscal in nature, resulting from financial profligacy of governments of deficit 
countries in the periphery. 2 Consequently, as it is their irresponsibility that has created the 
problems, it is only by their acceptance of the burden of adjustment that it will be resolved. 
Further, because fiscal over-stimulation is held responsible for inflationary pressures and 
the rising deficit-fuelled indebtedness that are unsettling financial markets, fiscal austerity is 
prescribed despite the deepening recession. The paramount requirement is seen to be 
balancing budgets and cutting sovereign debts so as to reduce the risk of default.  
 
The alternative view is that the crisis is one of balance of payments surpluses in the core 
and deficits in the periphery. From this perspective, far from remedying the crisis, fiscal 
austerity, by addressing the symptom (fiscal imbalance) rather than the cause (balance of 
payments imbalance), can only make matters worse by impeding economic recovery and 
lowering prospects for growth. Rapidly deepening and generalizing austerity is seen to be 
exacerbating the problem of escalating budget deficits and sovereign debt by pushing the 
Eurozone further into recession, which is reducing effective demand, shrinking the tax base 
by reducing incomes, and increasing social welfare and other recession related expenditure.  
 
The European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) appear to be 
interpreting the growing budget deficits and ever-increasing government debts as evidence 
of insufficient fiscal retrenchment; and they continue to cling to the orthodox belief that 
more austerity is needed to restore financial markets’ confidence, so as to secure their 
willingness to invest in sovereign bonds in exchange for reasonable rates of interest. Thus, 
the evidence that austerity has not had its predicted effects has done little to weaken its 
proponent’s belief in the efficacy of this approach, or their faith in its ultimate success. In an 
interview with the Wall Street Journal, ECB President Mario Draghi recently maintained: 
 
“There was no alternative to fiscal consolidation, and we should not deny that this is 
contractionary in the short term. In the future there will be the so-called confidence 
channel, which will reactivate growth; but it’s not something that happens immediately, 
and that’s why structural reforms are so important, because the short-term contraction 
will be succeeded by long-term sustainable growth only if these reforms are in place.” 
(Blackstone, et. al. 2012) 
 
He went on to contend that “a ‘good’ consolidation is one where taxes are lower and the 
lower government expenditure is on infrastructures and other investments ... the bad 
consolidation is ... raising taxes and cutting capital expenditure ... [because] it depresses 
potential growth.” (Blackstone, et. al. 2012). 
 
Yet, it is difficult to maintain, in the face of empirical evidence, that the Eurocrisis is 
primarily a crisis of public profligacy in the periphery. What those member states that today 
find themselves in difficulties had in common prior to the onset of the Eurocrisis, is that 
they all – Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland – ran growing trade deficits. (e.g. Wolf 2011). 
                                                        
1 The core Eurozone countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Netherlands. 
2 The periphery Eurozone countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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What they did not have in common were large public sector deficits prior to the onset of the 
global financial crisis (GFC) (see e.g. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 2009. Special Issue: 
The Global Financial Crisis vol. 33 (4)) and the Eurocrisis: although Spain and Ireland both 
had large private sector deficits, they had public sector budget surpluses. Portugal and 
Greece financed their trade deficits through both private and public sector deficits, with 
Portugal’s net public sector debt being lower than that of Germany as a percentage of its 
GDP, up until 2007. Only Italy had high net public sector debt (as a percentage of its GDP) 
throughout the 2000s until 2009, financed exclusively by capital inflows (current account 
deficits), while its private sector remained in surplus (e.g. Hein et al 2011). The current large 
public deficits in all of these economies were the consequence of the GFC when (with the 
exception of Italy) much of the private debt gone ‘bad’ was nationalized in one form or the 
other.  
 
The trade imbalances that emerged in the 2000s between Germany (as well as Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands) on the one hand, and Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland, on the other, were symptomatic of structural and growing difficulties in the 
periphery countries to maintain viable routes to international competitiveness. This has 
been particularly the case in the wake of growing manufacturing competition from 
emerging markets. However, a driving factor exacerbating this loss of international 
competitiveness was Germany’s strategy of ‘wage-less productivity growth’ within the 
Eurozone. Strong ‘wage-restraint’ policies in Germany drove down its unit labour costs. In 
combination with Germany’s long-standing strength in maintaining its high-technology 
infrastructure, this served to undermine an already weak lower-wage competitive 
advantage in its Southern European trading partners (e.g. Flassbeck and Spiecker 2011). Put 
another way, Germany reinforced its traitional high-productivity advantage by competing, in 
part, on the basis of low and falling labour unit costs, rather than using its high productivity 
to promote higher (collective) living standards at home and - through higher imports and 
foreign direct investment - in Southern Europe.  
 
Yet, if Germany’s wage-less-productivity-cum export-led growth strategy took little note of 
the various structural predicaments of its (mainly) Southern European EMU neighbours, the 
current financial and – ultimately – political crisis of the Eurozone, goes back to the deeply 
flawed architecture of European monetary and financial integration. This was laid down in 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. As almost all of the 
contributors to the Special Issue point out, this architecture combined unfettered private-
sector financial integration with both the abolition of monetary sovereignty in EMU 
member states and a very loose (or ‘soft’) supra-national fiscal policy framework that 
promoted restrictive fiscal policies at national level. However, it failed to establish a clear 
institutional path to supra-national fiscal policy-making. Essentially, this has created - in 
what is, after all, the second largest economy of the world (the EMU) - a supra-national 
monetary system that explicitly prioritizes the interests of private bondholders (creditors) 
over those of states: In the EMU, the formal ‘rules of the game’ of monetary and financial 
integration are more heavily stacked against state intervention, and in favour of private 
sector dominance than in any other advanced economy. Following the GFC, this has not 
only led to a destructive ‘tug of war’ between private financial markets driving up the 
borrowing costs of national governments in the EMU, on the one hand, and what central 
EMU ‘rump authority’ there is to try and keep these down, on the other. It has also put 
enormous pressure on political relations, both between the nation-states that integrate the 
EMU and within them, as witnessed in the outcome of the Italian national elections in 
February 2013. 
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The deeply flawed institutional and governance structure of the EMU placed it in a difficult 
position from which to effectively address the widening trade and macroeconomic 
imbalances within it, much less their escalation under the impact of the GFC. Yet, despite its 
exalted position in the creation of the EMU – as well as in the debates about its survival 
since the onset of the Eurocrisis – mainstream economic theory offers no coherent 
explanation for these regional imbalances. It is therefore a poor guide for policy.  
 
By contrast, cumulative causation theory – in particular as conceptualized by Gunnar Myrdal 
on the basis of his extensive research on inequality (both between individuals and regions) – 
offers a useful framework for understanding the root cause of regional inequalities and the 
cumulative processes at work. It is therefore a much better tool than economic orthodoxy 
for identifying the appropriate direction of policy. According to Myrdal (1957), orthodox 
economic theories were ‘never developed to comprehend the reality of great and growing 
economic inequalities and of the dynamic processes of underdevelopment and 
development’ (p. 51). They are therefore unable to explain the existence – and persistence, 
if not widening – of inequality within and among nations. From Myrdal’s perspective, such 
inequality is a consequence of the ‘circular and cumulative’ effects generated by the 
economic process itself. Further, within market systems, the endogenous and self-
reinforcing nature of economic change is such that ‘the play of forces within the market 
tends to increase rather than decrease the inequalities’ (Myrdal 1958: 26).  
 
Dynamic elements of trade between countries trigger what Myrdal identified as backwash 
and spread effects – and, hence, the possibility of uneven economic development. 
Backwash and spread are, respectively, the adverse and beneficial effects generated outside 
of an area of economic expansion as a consequence of differences in economic opportunity. 
Backwash effects include such things as outmigration of skilled labour from a lower wage 
region (i.e., ‘brain drain’), capital flight and difficulties attracting capital, unequal exchange 
in trade, deindustrialization; transfer of higher value-added production to the more 
prosperous region and concentration of lower-value-added production in the less 
prosperous region; deterioration in social relations and other non-economic factors. They 
are circular, cumulative and self-reinforcing; and they tend to dominate under a situation of 
laissez-faire.  
 
Against the backwash effects of economic expansion are certain centrifugal effects of 
expansionary momentum that spread to other regions. Spread effects operate ‘through 
increased demands for their products and in many other ways weave themselves into the 
cumulating social process by circular causation’ (Myrdal 1957: 31). The resulting increase in 
prices (including wages and other factor prices) provides opportunities for other regions to 
compete on the basis of lower production costs, setting off a virtuous cycle of expansionary 
possibility. Working in opposition to backwash effects, when strong enough, spread effects 
have the potential to generate an expansionary momentum that serves as a countervailing 
force against the backwash effects. However, Myrdal noted that national boundaries can 
serve as powerful barriers to spread effects:  
 
‘Differences in legislation, administration and mores, generally, in language, in basic 
valuations and beliefs, in levels of living, production capacities and facilities, make 
national boundaries much more effective barriers to the spread of expansionary 
momentum than any demarcation lines within one country can be ... Basically, the weak 
spread effects as between countries are ... a reflection of the weak spread effects within 
the under-developed countries themselves, caused by their low level of development 
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attained. In these circumstances, market forces will tend cumulatively to accentuate 
international inequalities.’ (Myrdal 1957: 54-55) 
 
In developing the concepts of backwash and spread effects, Myrdal emphasized the roles 
played by both economic and non economic factors – of which social, political and 
distributional effects are important. For Myrdal (1957), non-economic factors ‘are among 
the main vehicles for the circular causation in the cumulative processes of economic change’ 
(p. 30) and they react ‘in a disequilibrium way’ (p. 10). He also called attention to the 
dynamic, non-equilibrium nature of economic change.  
 
Until the arrival of the global financial crisis, the core Eurozone countries clearly benefitted 
from the single currency. Their exports became more competitive in world markets since 
the value of the euro against non-euro currencies was lower than the value of the national 
currencies it replaced. As a percentage of GDP, the average current account surplus for core 
members increased from 3.7% in 2000 to 4.7% in 2007 (Eurostat 2013). By contrast, those 
of the periphery became less (price) competitive and their average current account deficit 
rose steadily from 4.6% in 2000 to 8.5% in 2007 (Eurostat 2013). 3 
 
In the core, trade competitiveness – both internationally and within Europe – had self-
reinforcing positive effects on manufacturing output, employment and income levels, 
investment and technical change, productivity levels and exports. Germany, in particular 
benefitted. Its sub-contracting links with countries to the East were strengthened. This 
served to lower their production costs (Simmonazi, 2013), which were also kept down by 
labour market deregulation in Germany, which exerted downward pressure on money 
wages, especially those of the lowest paid. The effect of this on real living standards was 
ameliorated by the inflow of low cost consumer products, mainly from China. Consumption 
in Germany thus grew slowly relative to production capability; and the transfer of this 
surplus abroad made Germany the world’s leading exporter. Spread effects included closer 
integration of Eastern EU members’ production capability into the German productive 
system whilst backwash effects were the cumulative loss of industrial competitiveness of 
countries in the Eurozone’s periphery.  
 
However, despite their growing competitive disadvantage in international trade, many of 
the peripheral Eurozone members appeared to benefit from the availability of abundant, 
easy credit – at rates approaching those of the core. Since the Eurozone promised stability 
and growth as well as rising incomes and economic performance approaching the levels 
enjoyed in the core, private capital inflows combined with high levels of confidence to fuel 
domestic consumption booms in the periphery. Liberalized financial markets supported 
demand-driven growth; and asset bubbles inflated as property markets soared – especially 
in Spain and Ireland. Strong demand was accompanied by rising prices and costs, which 
further eroded trade competitiveness. But booming consumer, financial and property 
markets – and the strong rates of growth that accompanied them – gave the appearance of 
prosperity. Governments were also able to borrow at relatively low cost to finance 
increasing public expenditures whilst growing tax revenues generated by strong economic 
growth translated into improving fiscal positions. The resulting strong domestic demand-
driven growth thus gave the appearance of macroeconomic and fiscal strength in many of 
the peripheral Eurozone countries whilst the Northern Eurozone countries benefitted 
further from the cumulative loss of trade competitiveness in the periphery.  
 
                                                        
3
 Countries that have joined since the 2007/8 financial crisis began (Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia 
and Slovakia) are not included in this analysis. 
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The GFC halted cross-border flow of private finance, causing property bubbles and other 
private sector activities to collapse, and fiscal deficits to grow. At this point, the excessive 
risks that had been taken by financial institutions (and the failure of governments to 
regulate them), the excessive debt-fuelled spending by households, and the gaps in 
competitiveness were ruthlessly exposed – as were the financial backwash effects of the 
flow of capital into the financial markets of the periphery. 
 
The Eurozone private sector debt problem quickly morphed into a sovereign debt crisis as 
governments attempted to rescue their banking systems by loans, guarantees and 
nationalization. The resulting high levels of public debt and the inability of Eurozone 
countries, individually, to expand their money supply meant that the risk of default was a 
credible one. Capital flight from the sovereign debt of countries most at risk dramatically 
raised their cost of re-financing – starting with Greece but quickly followed by Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland and Spain. This perceived need for a European rescue plan based on austerity 
translated into further fiscal deflation, a worsening economic crisis and financial instability 
as the vicious cycle continued to play itself out. In the process, regional imbalances within 
the Eurozone have been revealed, and have substantially widened as the crisis has 
deepened.  
 
Austerity programmes are reinforcing the vicious cycle of cumulative decline, extending 
from the economic to the social and political. In turn, non-economic factors are having 
circular and cumulative economic effects as growing social unrest creates political instability. 
In the process, inequality continues to rise, not only across Eurozone countries, but also 
within their most deprived regions. All of this raises fundamental questions about the 
theories and institutional structure underpinning the Eurozone, which itself is rooted in a 
belief in the ability of markets to produce a stable equilibrium with beneficial and equitable 
outcomes for its disparate members.  
 
2. The Eurocrisis unfolding: Monetary and fiscal policy responses so far 
 
On 10 October 2008, in the midst of the unfolding global financial crisis, Financial Times 
journalist Gillian Tett warned of trouble ahead for the Eurozone, taking a widening spread in 
the costs of insuring European sovereign debt as her clue.  
 
“What the CDS market suggests”, she wrote, “is that investors are becoming more 
worried about the fiscal implications of bank bail-outs and financial stress. Moreover, 
these concerns are also threatening to undermine the single currency ideal that 
eurozone countries move as a pack. […] After all, what this crisis [the GFC, the authors] 
has shown is that, when it comes to the crunch, European governments are truly 
hopeless at co-ordinating themselves. So, if you take that trend to its logical extremes 
and imagine a brutal recession - or perhaps additional financial stress - it is not hard to 
imagine that economic nationalism will rise. After all, we are already seeing hints of this 
in the fight between the UK and Iceland about retail deposits. If that tussle was ever 
repeated inside the eurozone, currency union could come under strain.” (Tett 2008). 
 
Despite her caution at the time – “this is not a scenario I am forecasting with high 
probability. But nor should it be completely ignored.” (Tett 2008) – Tett was spot on. Even 
so, what is now known as “the Eurocrisis” did not officially set in until April/May 2010, when 
Greek sovereign debt came up for negotiation with the Troika. As mentioned, what ensued 
over the next two years and four months was a destabilizing and counter-productive ‘tug of 
war’ between private financial markets driving up the costs of re-financing sovereign debt in 
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crisis-ridden EMU member states, on the one hand, and the Troika, trying to keep these 
costs down, on the other. A truce was finally called on 06 September 2012, when Mario 
Draghi, President of the ECB, announced the introduction of so-called Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMTs), thereby effectively recognizing the ECB’s role as lender of last resort 
to the EMU. 
 
Prior to 06 September 2012, the Troika’s approach to the widening Eurocrisis had been 
dominated by its insistence on a “market-friendly” solution that strove to combine private 
sector participation in the re-negotiation of the sovereign debt of EMU member states with 
limiting the role played by the ECB to indirect interventions. In the face of a growing threat 
to the Eurozone’s entire banking system and a deepening EMU-wide economic crisis, this 
resulted in a series of ad hoc policy and institutional innovations, beginning with the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), created in May 2010 in response to the 
escalating Greek sovereign debt crisis.  
 
The EFSF’s rescue mechanism consisted essentially of extending large and still relatively 
expensive loan packages to all but bankrupt states, using the proceeds obtained from 
issuing bonds and other more complex debt instruments on the capital markets. A core 
feature of the EFSF loan packages for Greece, Portugal and Ireland are the stringent 
austerity conditionalities attached to these. From the start, the EFSF was authorized to 
intervene in primary and secondary bond markets, enforce conditionalities, and also to 
extend its lending facilities to EMU governments not already party to any of its programmes, 
such as Spain, for the purpose of recapitalising banks and financial institutions at risk of 
insolvency. In October 2010, barely five months into its existence as a temporary rescue 
facility, the European authorities declared their intention to transform the EFSF into a 
permanent institution, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),that eventually entered 
into force on 08 October 2012. Over the two and a half years since its creation , the 
EFSF/ESM largely failed to restore financial market confidence in the ability of European 
authorities (and the IMF) to gain control of the spiralling Eurocrisis, prompting instead 
recurrent speculative attacks on sovereign debt in crisis-ridden EMU member states. A 
prime example of this ‘tug of war’ between the Troika and financial investors is the so-called 
‘Accord of 27 October 2011’ on Greek sovereign debt. The deal achieved only a very brief 
stabilisation of European stock markets, mainly because it relied on uncertain co-operation 
by private creditors and on heroic assumptions about a positive long-term impact of the 
harshest austerity programme in modern history on the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio.  
 
In May 2011, the ECB began to engage in massive purchases of government bonds from 
crisis-ridden EMU member states in the secondary bond markets, and to lend to these 
governments indirectly, through loans to commercial banks that had been financing 
government debt. In December 2011, so-called long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
were officially adopted. Through these, the ECB offered to lend to Eurobanks at an interest 
charge of around 1 per cent over three years and on fairly lax repayment conditions. This 
was in the hope that it would bring further relief to GIPS (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain) governments, whose bonds were trading at six per cent and above. Again, the results 
were disappointing – Eurobanks preferred to cash-in on cheap ECB loans for almost any 
purpose other than buying GIPS government bonds. The ‘market verdict’ was unambiguous: 
Unless the EMU were to show its hand as a quasi-nation state with a central bank capable of 
acting as a lender of last resort to the Eurozone, neither primary nor secondary markets for 
EMU government debt would stabilize. The widely recognized failure of LTROs signalled the 
end of “market-friendly” solutions to the Eurocrisis, with the ECB fast running out of policy 
options within this remit. 
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The introduction of OMTs from 06 September 2012 finally saw the ECB assuming a role as 
the ‘banker of government(s)’, contrary to its legal and long-standing political commitments 
to resist this role. Essential for the effectiveness of OMTs in stabilising bond markets and 
averting a surge in capital flight are two features of the programme: First, there is no 
quantitative or temporary limit on purchases of sovereign bonds of one- to three-year 
maturity and, second, the ECB gave up its senior credit status. To qualify for ECB bond 
purchases, countries either have to subscribe to a full and long-term austerity programme 
(such as the EFSF programmes for Greece, Portugal and Ireland), or to enter into a less 
stringent ‘precautionary programme’ designed to provide them with a line of credit for the 
duration of what are considered short-term temporary shocks to their otherwise ‘sound’ 
economies (such as the ESM programmes for Spain and Italy).  
 
So far, OMTs appear to be reasonably successful in stabilising the European bond markets, 
essentially by assuaging investor uncertainty about the potential exit of some of its weaker 
economies. Paradoxically, the transformation of the ECB from a handmaiden to private 
bondholder interests into a (potentially) full-blown banker of governments has at least 
partly been driven by the very rentier interests that the architects of the Maastricht Treaty 
and EU Stability and Growth Pact intended to protect from ‘excessive’ state intervention. 
Yet, the unintended consequence of a largely finance-led process of economic integration 
has been to empower not only private bondholders but also, indirectly, indebted 
governments. Just as private bondholders have engaged in a ‘tug of war’ over the costs of 
government debt with the European Central Banking System (ECBS) to obtain a de facto 
“Europeanisation” of this debt, so indebted governments can use the threat of default and 
exit to obtain the same result. Given very high levels of financial integration, this threat is 
tantamount to a European banking crisis and, possibly, to the break-up of the Eurozone, 
leaving the ECBS with little credible choice but to refinance government debts, one way or 
another.  
 
It is, however, far less clear that the emergence of a ‘lender of last resort’ will suffice to 
safeguard the EMU from further economic turmoil and political destabilization. Obviously, 
the long and torturous stand-off between financial markets and the Troika, that preceded 
this outcome, has already imposed huge economic, social and political costs on the wider 
process of European integration. These have to be added to the deep macroeconomic 
imbalances that had evolved between core and periphery economies in the EMU prior to 
the onset of the Eurocrisis. In the predominant policy perspective of the Troika, the greater 
good of saving the EMU from another major banking crisis may justify the smaller evil of 
allowing the ECB to take on its role as ‘lender of last resort’ in all but formal language. But 
this compromise only reinforces the need to safeguard the wider economic founding 
principles of the EMU, namely its iron commitment to private sector-led economic 
development and to monetary stability, to be achieved through low inflation and low 
government borrowing. With the process of immediate ‘fire-fighting’ apparently out of the 
way, the debate has moved on to strategies for economic recovery and growth, in particular 
but not exclusively, in the debt-ridden periphery countries. For the advocates of the 
monetarist and neoliberal founding principles of the EMU – or as heterodox opponents to 
this approach would have it, the founding flaws of the EMU – the only viable strategy 
remains austerity. In fact, austerity is the price to be extracted from governments that are 
being ‘bailed out’ and by their ordinary citizen, not from private bondholders.  
 
Beyond the highly controversial austerity and ‘precautionary’ programmes imposed on 
individual EMU member states by the EFSF/EMS (see e.g. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
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2012. Special Issue: Austerity: Making the same mistakes again – or is it different this time? 
vol. 36 (1)), austerity is currently being written-into-stone for EU member states through the 
so-called ‘European Fiscal Compact’, that came into force on 01 January 2013 for (so far) 
twelve signatory governments. At its heart is the ‘golden rule’ of public finance. This 
stipulates that once signatory governments approach a debt threshold of 60% of their GDP, 
they should run an annual budget surplus or maintain a balanced annual budget, such that 
their annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP. Thus, beyond a 
historically low debt-to-GDP ratio for most countries, EU governments shall not borrow: If 
the EMU, or any of the signatories to the Fiscal Compact, were to be hit by mass 
unemployment, an ecological crisis of major dimensions, a war or an invasion by aliens, its 
governments will have to stand by and let the private sector sort out the problem.  
 
Just as the infamous EMU membership requirements, laid down in the predecessor to the 
‘Fiscal Compact’, the EU Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, were eventually relaxed in 2005 
and again in 2011, there does, of course, remain a question mark over the long-term 
staying-power of ideological doctrine vis-à-vis the need for political and economic 
pragmatism. For now, however, there can be little doubt that ideology rules the roost. If 
confirmation were needed, it suffices to recall the recent negotiations about the next long-
term EU budget for 2014-2020 that took place on 07 and 08 February 2013 in Brussels. 
These resulted in a cut of €34 billion to planned ‘real’ expenditures (as opposed to so-called 
‘commitments’ to allocate funds to specific projects). Even if ‘only’ around 1 per cent of the 
EU’s combined gross national income was at stake, the fight over what, in the larger picture 
of European integration and the future of the EMU, are economically insignificant decisions 
was ferocious and the triumphalism of austerity hawks unalloyed.  
 
This ideological stance, if it lasts in acts as well as in words, is bound to undermine the little 
stability that may have been achieved by way of the ECB finally, though half-heartedly 
assuming its role as lender of last resort. Important as this is, no ‘banker of EMU 
governments’ alone can resolve the vast institutional and growing structural problems that 
caused the Eurocrisis. As virtually all contributors to this Special Issue argue, the underlying 
structural, institutional and policy issues that led to widening trade and macroeconomic 
imbalances between core and periphery economies require profound institutional and 
policy reforms. Institutionally, the Eurozone’s central bank requires a Government, and in 
particular, a federal treasury (or equivalent). Yet, fiscal federalism will be useful only to the 
extent that it promotes policies that prioritize long-term and balanced regional economic 
growth over short-term financial interests and ideological grand-standing. This is a tall order, 
since, in the detail, any such growth strategy will have to build on the intra- as well as supra-
national co-ordination of a range of policy areas. These include the promotion of 
(inter)national competitiveness by alternative means to low-wage competition alone; wider 
industrial and technology policies; social and income policies; and environmental policies. It 
is far from clear that conflicting national, as well as class and sectoral interests can be 
reconciled, if only to the extent required to create a functional institutionalisation of 
differentiated, yet centrally co-ordinated, fiscal and growth-enhancing policy-making at EU 
level. What is clear, however, is that the current obsession amongst the most powerful EU 
leaders with austerity is entirely counter-productive to this objective: Obliging all 
governments to run fiscal surpluses (beyond a minimal debt-to-GDP ratio) is tantamount to 
deepening the on-going economic and debt crisis in the Eurozone, as well as its internal 
macroeconomic imbalances. By simple national accounting logic, such fiscal surpluses must 
be more than offset by trade surpluses and/or private sector surpluses, for GDP to rise. With 
private sector investment already falling, and the route to trade surpluses barred to all but a 
handful of high-productivity economies in the Eurozone, austerity can achieve only one 
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thing: to further undermine whatever “mutual confidence” there may have been “at the 
heart of our community” when the Euro was introduced. 
 
3. The contributions to this Special Issue 
 
All contributions to this Special Issue are concerned with an explanation of the causes of the 
Eurocrisis and, in most cases, a discussion of policy proposals and reform strategies to 
stabilize the Eurozone and to promote future economic growth in the region. Unsurprisingly, 
the two common themes that dominate the causal analysis of the Eurocrisis are flaws in the 
architecture of European economic policy-making and the emergence of persistent 
macroeconomic regional imbalances within the EMU. Taken together, the contributions 
provide a systematic overview of both these themes, that is clear in its basic critique of 
central flaws in European and EMU economic governance, very rich in detail and conducted 
from a range of different analytical, historical and policy perspectives. There is a clear 
consensus that the current institutional setting of the EMU/EU is not only inconsistent but 
also fundamentally unsustainable.  
 
Naturally, the discussion of policy strategies aimed at facilitating a more egalitarian and 
sustainable European growth regime is more tentative. However, the consensus that 
emerges is clear: austerity is doomed to fail in achieving any narrow objective of debt 
reduction in periphery EMU economies. Further, and more importantly, it is bound to 
aggravate economic, political and social tensions within the EMU and the EU, with the 
attendant risk of contributing to the implosion of European integration. On the constructive 
side, the view that prevails is that if the EMU and progressive European economic 
integration is to survive, institutional reform at the EMU-level will need to move towards a 
fiscal union, in some fashion. Yet there is no shortage of warnings to the effect that 
institutional reform towards a centralization process that balances monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments more equitably is heavily reliant on growth-enhancing policies being 
adopted. The contributors are also well aware of the profound challenges to a growth-
enhancing and reformed process of economic integration in Europe that are posed by 
complex conflicts between national, class and sectoral interests. Taken together, the 
contributions provide a constructive basis for further debate on forward-looking policy 
across a range of areas. 
 
Fitoussi and Sarencino (2013) argue that the EU has gone further than any other advanced 
economy in adopting the neoliberal policy agenda of the Washington Consensus, by 
embracing this as a matter of quasi-constitutional principles. In their view, the “Berlin-
Washington Consensus” is largely responsible for the European “growth deficit” (2013, p. 4) 
during the two decades preceding the Eurocrisis; and it has made a fast recovery from this 
crisis all but impossible. Fitoussi and Sarencino (2013) provide a critical analysis of the core 
theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the “Berlin-Washington Consensus”, arguing in 
particular that it fails to take into account important dynamic links between current and 
future economic growth. Using a simple macroeconomic model, they show how the 
EU/EMU’s singular focus on structural reform aimed at increasing competition and 
openness, is bound to produce a negative trade-off with short-term stabilization policies. 
Based on a detailed discussion of the main limitations of European monetary and fiscal 
governance – and of what they consider to be an ”inconsistent institutional setting” at the 
heart of European policy-making – Fitoussi and Saranceni conclude that unless the “Berlin-
Washington-Consensus” can be overturned, there is little hope both for a successful 
recovery from the Eurocrisis and for the Euro’s long-term survival.  
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Bellofiore (2013), too, places the Eurocrisis within a wider analysis of the defining features, 
as he sees them, of global capitalism during the past three decades. This was characterized 
by a finance-led “privatized Keynesianism” (2013, p. 1) – i.e., by the combination of the 
primacy of finance with credit- and debt-fuelled consumption booms. Bellofiore then turns 
to European economic and political history, tracing Western European “neo-mercantilism” 
back to the late 1940s and to changing German-French-Italian policy relations throughout 
the 1960s, 70s and early 80s. In his view, the Euro, far from representing the logical 
outcome of the history of European integration and the end of the Cold War, was more 
prosaically a French-driven project to contain the political and economic implications of 
German reunification during the 1990s. From this perspective, the Eurocrisis was an 
exogenous shock to a single currency that initially worked well, despite its almost ad hoc 
construction, but whose fundamental flaws quickly became apparent in the course of this 
crisis. Bellofiore maintains that the only sustainable solution to the Eurocrisis is a class-
based New Keynesian Deal that goes beyond fiscal expansionism per se, to involve a radical 
“socialization of investment” and a shift towards collective (rather than privatized) demand 
as the engine of growth. 
 
Mazier and Petit (2013) begin with a detailed empirical investigation of intra-EMU 
macroeconomic imbalances, based on an estimate of existing underlying real exchange rate 
misalignments and of the costs and benefits of required real adjustment (of prices and 
wages) in EMU member states. The extent of structural diversity throughout the Eurozone 
(and of the underlying overvaluation of the Euro for a large number of its member  
economies) suggests to the authors that “financial federalism” (2013, p. 10) or the 
“Europeanisation” of debt, in one form or another, does not provide a sustainable solution 
to the Eurocrisis. This is particularly the case in the context of the prevailing dominance of 
deregulated global financial markets. They then discuss a range of alternative, more 
sustainable paths out of the Eurocrisis, including various approaches to budgetary 
federalism, all of which require strong political commitments to a unified Europe. The 
authors argue that since this imposes a strong political constraint on economic solutions to 
the Eurocrisis that envisage a full-blown fiscal union, a “multi-speed Europe” could provide 
an alternative solution. This essentially provides for a flexible approach to national 
structural and social policy regimes across EMU member states through a lower degree of 
fiscal centralization and the introduction of a two-tier Eurosystem, in which a single 
“external” euro coexists with fixed parities between national “internal” euros. However, the 
authors also note that this would require the introduction of capital controls. 
 
Boyer (2013) proposes a multi-causal analysis of the trajectory of the Euro, from initial 
success to a systemic crisis, not least with a view to “overcome th[e] rather simplistic 
dichotomy of ‘full federalism versus the death of the Euro’” (Boyer 2013, p.4). Specifically, 
he identifies two processes along this trajectory whose interaction explains the complexity 
and depth of the Eurocrisis. The first pertains to the role of economic theorizing in the 
formation of dominant beliefs about the invulnerability of market economies. According to 
Boyer, the rise of the New Classical Macroeconomics successfully sidelined substantial 
concerns, derived from mainstream as well as heterodox economic theory, about the ability 
of the Euro to cope with heterogeneous capitalisms and modes of regulation within the 
Eurozone. Second, with the creation of the Euro, a perverse political process set in, that 
strengthened the ability of national governments to defend national liberalization agendas 
against contestation at home by pointing to external constraints from Brussels, while also 
undermining actual enforcement powers by European authorities, as well as their wider 
legitimacy in the longer run. Both processes help to explain the inability of the European 
authorities to respond decisively to the Eurocrisis, in a way that could halt contagion and 
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restore the Euro’s creditability. In Boyer’s view, the future of the Euro remains open for now, 
with both a political implosion of the Eurozone and a more democratic re-configuration of 
national and central policy processes within the EMU still on the cards. 
 
Toporowski (2013) analyses the prospects of the EMU from the perspective of theoretical 
approaches to the explanation of how monetary unions operate. In line with other 
contributors, he maintains that the Eurocrisis is the result not simply of a bad policy mix, but 
of systematic institutional flaws in the construction of the Eurozone. In his view, at the heart 
of major deficiencies in the architecture of economic policy-making in the EMU, before and 
after the crisis, is the prevailing dominance of the theory of optimal currency areas. This is 
based on an outdated Ricardian conceptualisation of money as a commodity or a fiat 
currency. According to this analysis, the exchange rate and wages are substitutes for 
achieving international competitiveness; and the current difficulties of the EMU can be 
reduced to relative wage differentials across its member states. Toporowski develops a 
detailed critique of this approach, based on his alternative conceptualization of a “pure 
credit international economy” (2013, p. 6), characterized by credit money that is backed by 
debt. In this alternative view, trade imbalances are not accommodated by the accumulation 
of commodity or fiat money, but are, instead, absorbed into the balance sheets of banking 
systems. Toporowski then explores a number of theoretical and policy implications that 
follow from his analysis. In the context of advanced financial integration in Europe, a core 
implication for the debate on the Eurocrisis is that exit from the Eurozone is not a viable 
option for indebted economies: exchange rates and wages are not to ?be regarded as 
simple substitutes for macroeconomic adjustment; the import-intensity of exports – and 
therefore the need for additional austerity – must also be taken into account. More 
importantly, exchange rate depreciations in any exit economy would put at risk the entire 
European banking system, due to the vulnerability of bank balance sheets to such 
depreciations in a “pure credit international economy”. 
 
Panico and Purificato (2013) provide a detailed account of the unfolding of the Eurocrisis 
since May 2010, using this to highlight core difficulties and shortcomings in the process of 
policy co-ordination at European level. In their analysis, this process is characterized by a 
high level of uncertainty about the actual behaviour of national actors and central 
authorities. This has two main consequences: first, it means that non-cooperation and a 
defensive or minimalist approach to policy co-ordination persistently undermines the search 
for, and enforcement of, credible policy solutions for the EMU as a whole – and, therefore, 
its overall economic performance. Second, these constraints manifest themselves in the 
interaction between national and central players and institutions. Importantly, they have 
been ‘internalized’ by the ECB, thus hampering its internal decision-making process and 
policy-effectiveness. In the authors’ view, despite the eventual introduction of OMTs in 
September 2012, these internal conflicts will impede a resolute assumption of the ECB’s role 
as lender of last resort in the future. The authors conclude that, seen in conjunction with 
the prevailing doctrine of austerity in the fiscal policy domain, continued uncertainty in the 
process of policy coordination – within the ECB and between national and central players – 
does not bode well for the chances of substantial institutional and economic reform in the 
Eurozone. 
 
The remaining contributions focus on specific aspects of the Eurocrisis and on areas for 
policy reform. Bibow (2013) examines the influence of German intellectual and historical 
traditions on the Eurosystem and, in particular, on the ECB. Through a comparative analysis 
of the peculiarities of German intellectual thought on the role of central banks in the 
economy, on the one hand, and Keynes’s chartist conceptualization of money and central 
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banks, on the other, Bibow shows how a supposedly “super-strong” – yet in practice often 
much weaker than perceived – ECB came to dominate policy-making in the Eurozone. Core 
to Bibow’s argument is the insight that the dominance of monetarist central banking over 
fiscal policy-making and institutions in Germany (and eventually the EMU) derives not 
primarily from theoretical debate, but from the political history of modern Germany and 
from deeply rooted ‘mythologies’ about this history. Whereas Keynes considered the 
central bank to be an integral part of the state, in Germany it evolved into a guardian of 
private business interests vis-à-vis a state that was perceived to have been captured by 
labour interests and to use fiscal policy to dominate the economy. Bibow then explores the 
implications of this particularly German heritage for the Eurozone, both with regard to its 
original policy design and the implications of this policy design for a viable resolution to the 
Eurocrisis. 
 
Caparo and Perrotini (2013) explore the Latin American political and economic experience 
with debt crises to identify lessons that might be learnt for the Eurozone. The authors 
extend the Harrod-Pasinetti model of the role of public debt in a closed economy to 
emerging market open economies with demand-constrained output growth. From this, they 
argue that expansionary fiscal policy is the most efficient policy strategy to reduce excessive 
debt burdens on the macro-economy, and to return the economy to a growth-compatible 
level of debt. This theoretical analysis of the relationship between public debt and economic 
growth in open economies is accompanied by a discussion of Latin American experiences 
with austerity measures in response to debt crises that resulted in the so-called “lost 
decade” of Latin American economic development. Notwithstanding obvious differences 
between the political economies of Latin American and European countries, as well as their 
differing roles in the international economy, Caparo and Perrotini warn that the core lesson 
to be learnt from Latin American experiences for Europe is that more debt is the solution to 
debt-induced economic downturns. Unless this lesson is learnt soon, Europe is headed 
towards long-term economic stagnation, such as that experienced by Latin America during 
the 1980s. 
 
Simonazzi, Ginzberg and Nocella (2013) return to the theme of the dominant role of the 
German economy in the Eurozone, from the perspective of trade relations and balance of 
payment imbalances between EMU member states. They explore alternative explanations 
of the German current account surplus – as the result of virtuous savings behaviour and/or 
of stagnant domestic demand – and argue that an expansion of domestic demand in 
Germany will alone be insufficient to address current trade imbalances in the EMU, the 
persistence of which is reflective of a complex pattern and uneven pace of trade 
specialization, diversification and quality composition in Germany, relative to its Southern 
periphery neighbours. The cumulative effects of these specialization patterns on productive 
structures in Germany and the Southern periphery therefore require more sophisticated 
policy responses to regional imbalances than expansive income and fiscal policies in 
Germany. In particular, they highlight the need for coordinated trade and industrial policies 
aimed at improving the long-term international competitiveness of current deficit 
economies, including an expansion of trade relations between these. 
 
Grahl and Teague (2013) discuss the role of social policy in restoring credibility to a post-
crisis EMU. Their detailed survey of the origins and past evolution of EU social policy 
highlights the persistent ambiguities that have characterized social policy-making at EU level 
over the years, mostly as a consequence of the lack of convergence of national labour 
markets and their institutions. With the Eurocrisis and austerity having undermined what 
little consistency EU social policy achieved in the past, they argue that a fresh and ambitious 
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approach to social policy is essential for a successful resolution of the crisis, both in socio-
economic as well as political terms. On grounds of realism, they assume that neither a fully-
fledged fiscal union nor strongly centralized and harmonized social policies are likely to 
emerge soon. However, they conclude that the survival of the Eurozone will require a major 
transfer of sovereignty to a central government with the capacity to design and implement 
differentiated fiscal policies across member states, and to which the ECB is subordinated. In 
this context, social policy would also have to remain differentiated, but would fulfill two 
core roles in the reconstruction of the Eurozone: economically, a differentiated, yet highly 
active social policy would initially focus on public sector-led employment recovery. 
Politically, a strongly solidaric?, yet differentiated social policy would provide federal 
institutions with much needed legitimacy.  
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